

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Greece

DATE DISTR. 16 MAY 1949

SUBJECT Various Reactions to the Decisions Reached
 at the KKE 5th Plenary Session
 25X1A6a

NO. OF PAGES
 25X1A2g

PLACE
 ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.
 (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO. See below

25X1X6

CIA LIBRARY

SUPPLEMENT TO
 REPORT NO.

Views of Stergios Anastassiades

1. In early February Stergios Anastassiades (Organizing Secretary of the KKE Central Committee delegation in Athens until his arrest in early March 1949), expressed in confidence his disagreement with the decisions taken at the 5th Plenary Session of the KKE Central Committee, and stated that:
 - a. A very serious fractional struggle would have resulted in the Party if the present situation had arisen under peace-time conditions.
 - b. At present there was little hope that the situation would develop further as General Zachariades was obviously in full control in the mountains, and would without hesitation order malcontents to return to the mountains, where they would be tried summarily by the "People's Courts".
 - c. Zachariades' policy towards his subordinates was, however, becoming intolerable, and Anastassiades wondered if an anti-Zachariades movement fomented in Athens would have any chance of success.
 - d. Demetrios Partsalides could not be counted upon to support such a movement, for he would always follow blindly the directives of Zachariades, as would Nikolas Georgalis (Political Commissar of the Rebel Army), Nikolas Danielides (1st Secretary of the Communist Organization of Piraeus - KOP), Maria Manousaki (Security official and enlightener of the Rebel Army Attica Brigade) and Zisis Zographos (Central Security official).
 - e. It was highly unlikely that Ioannis Ioannides (Premier of the Rebel Junta*) would make a move at the present time, for he was a selfish opportunist himself, and fully realized the strength of Zachariades' position. Ioannides' followers included several important members of KOA, KOP, KOAtt and the Rebel Army.
 - f. Anastassiades himself had the support of a considerable number of Trade Union officials (being a former Trade Unionist himself), and he was also very popular in the women's sections of the Party.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION		Document No. 5
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR		FBI				NO CHANGE in Class.

☐ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 15 MAY 1978 By: 019

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1A2a

- 2 -

Views of Elias Baltas

2. During a conversation in early February 1949 between Anastassiades and Elias Baltas (Commander of the Rebel Army Attica Brigade) on the subject of the dismissal of General Markos, and its effect on former members of the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS) in the Rebel Army Attica Brigade, Baltas remarked that Markos appeared to have met the same fate as Gomułka in Poland.
3. Anastassiades, while agreeing that this seemed to be the case, advised Baltas to refrain from making such remarks so openly, as the Party "Vigilance" might well lay hands upon him. Baltas replied that he could not agree that he had said anything reprehensible or anti-Party, and added that he had based his impressions on Markos' farewell speech on 4 February.
4. At a later date, Baltas stated in confidence during a conversation with a friend that he resented the above remarks made to him by Anastassiades, as he was a soldier with a clean record of seven years' service in the Party, and had nothing to fear from "politicians". He consequently was not afraid to say that he disagreed with the decisions of the 5th Plenary Session, and his view was that Zachariades, from his vantage point away from danger, had made scapegoats of Markos and Hadjivassiliou for the setbacks to EKE's cause in 1948, for which the whole Party was responsible.
5. Baltas also made the following statements:
 - a. Zachariades' whole political career had been marked by a continuous selfish struggle on his part to eliminate not only his political opponents, but his closest collaborators as well, if they achieved undue distinction.
 - b. Zachariades and his intrigues had been responsible for the death or dismissal of many important members of EKE and it was natural that Markos, on account of his growing popularity, should have been "next on the list".
 - c. When attending sessions of the Rebel Supreme War Council in the past, Baltas had observed that Vasilios Bartziotas (Politburo representative on the Supreme War Council) had taken great care to avoid decisions placing former senior ELAS officials in controlling posts in the Rebel Army or administration. Clearly the object was to eliminate any possible influence of senior ELAS members upon the Rebel Army troops.
 - d. Former ELAS members, who had in the early days of the present civil war received appointments as Unit Commanders, were today relegated to more junior positions, to lessen the risk of a 'coup de main' against the Zachariades-Politburo clique. Markos had retained his post for some time only because he had always acceded to all Politburo orders or decisions delivered to his Headquarters.
 - e. Zachariades was fond of saying that the former ELAS officials had become infected, during the occupation, with "the opportunism of Siantos and Zevgos", and with "National-Socialism", and that there was no known cure for it.
 - f. Since his return to Greece in 1945, Zachariades had caused irreparable damage to the Party, and had persistently criticized all that the Party leadership had done during the occupation years.
6. Baltas frankly admitted that if he were not satisfied with the Party explanations forthcoming on the decisions reached at the 5th Plenary Session, he would consider making a public statement on the subject, and leaving the Party.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1A2g

- 3 -

Parties in Disagreement

7. In mid-February 1949, Anastasiades sent for Nikolas Kitsikis (member of the Apparat, and President of the Hellenic-Soviet League). He instructed him to curb the impatience of Party followers under his control, for reports had been received of heated discussions at the Hellenic-Soviet League, at the Science and Reconstruction Society (Epistimi Anoiikodomisi - EP-AN), and at the Trikoupi Political Club, on the decisions of the 5th Plenary Session as given in the local press.
8. In Athens, on 21 March 1949, "Nestoras" Farmakis (acting Secretary of KOA) submitted a report to Demetrios Partsalides (member of the Politburo stationed in Athens**) on the results of the analysis made for the majority of the KOA members regarding the decisions reached at the KKE 5th Plenary Session. It was stated that out of a total of 985 analyses 94 members were in disagreement, chiefly on the Macedonian question, and that 34 had been dismissed while the rest were under surveillance.
9. Over 400 deportees had also expressed their disagreement, and the great majority had signed "acts of renouncement" and publicly denounced KKE.
10. Farmakis stated to Partsalides that it was thought that, by the end of March, the decisions of the 5th Plenary Session would have been analyzed for all members of KOA, and that he would then submit a full list of members in disagreement. Partsalides declared that he hoped that the final results would be more favorable than those already submitted, and expressed much concern over the possibility of an "opposition group" arising within KOA. He felt that, under the circumstances, the results among deportees might have been worse.

Views of Partsalides

11. Late in March Partsalides admitted in private conversation that morale in KOA and KOP was presently at a very low ebb, and that it had reached its nadir in February. He attributed this state of affairs to the success of Government propaganda, the unfavorable reception of pronouncements by KKE and NOF on the Macedonian issue, and the considerable successes of the Greek National Army in the Peloponnese (where the Party had quite lost the game), at Florina and in the Kerdhillion Range.

25X1A6a

* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Comment - Reported by Andarte radio as new Rebel Government Vice-Premier (14 April 1949).

25X1A6a

** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Comment - Reported by Andarte radio as new Rebel Government Premier (14 April 1949).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~